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AnonymityAbstract Recently, Wu et al. proposed a password-based remote user authentication scheme for
the integrated Electronic Patient Record (EPR) information system to achieve mutual authentica-
tion and session key agreement over the Internet. They claimed that the scheme resists various
attacks and offers lower computation cost, data integrity, conﬁdentiality and authenticity.
However, we observed that the scheme cannot withstand lost smartcard/off-line password guessing,
privileged-insider and known session-speciﬁc temporary information attacks, and lacks the require-
ments of lost smartcard revocation and users’ anonymity. Besides, the password change phase is
inconvenient to use because a user cannot change his password independently. Thus, we proposed
a new password-based user authentication scheme for the integrated EPR information system that
would be able to resist detected security ﬂaws of Wu et al.’s scheme.
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The rapid growth of Information and Communication
Technologies has the potential to support the transition from
centralized computer systems to open networks (Chen et al.,
2009). Thus, the historic paper-based medical information sys-
tems are now being replaced by the electronic media-based sys-
tem known as e-medicine (Elberg, 2001). However, the e-
medicine systems lack to gather patients’ medical records scat-
tered among different medical institutions. Since the patients
often visited various medical institutions where they left their
medical histories, so many times the doctors are facing prob-
lems to make correct diagnosis or clinical decision. Thus, an
Table 1 Notations used in Wu et al.’s scheme.
Notations Meaning
A The medical service requester (user)
pw The password of user A
ID The identity of user A
S The integrated EPR information system (server)
h(Æ) One-way and secure cryptographic hash function
 Bit-wise XOR operation
|| Concatenation operator
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to collect patients’ paper-based information from different
places, convert them to digital records and make them avail-
able so that any legitimate users (i.e., physicians, nurses, insur-
ance companies, patients) can access over the Internet.
The EPR information system can be deﬁned as electronic
medium that can store complete or partial patients’ records
(Leiner et al., 2003) and now it becomes an essential medium
for communication, research and monitoring medical informa-
tion systems (Huang et al., 2011). It helps hospitals and medi-
cal institutions to back up patients’ health information, and
reduced the number of errors, loss of medical integration or
failure of patients’ medical histories. In addition, it offers enor-
mous facility to the doctors to access patients’ medical his-
tories that not only assist to make correct clinical decisions,
but also use to maintain and analyze patients’ health. It also
helps to access patients’ information for management and
resource planning of scientiﬁc research, or other services
bound to be developed and integrated into e-medicine
(Gritzalis et al., 2005). Besides, it can also provide patients’
complete and correct medical problems along with other func-
tions such as medical alerts or reminders, clinical decision sup-
port, and links to their medical supporting groups.
The EPR information system requires a mutual authentica-
tion mechanism that allows legitimate users to access patients’
medical information stored on a remote server. However,
security and privacy are two major issues, since the communi-
cation channel is often sniffed by benign adversary who can
intercept, modify and delete the messages. To cope these prob-
lems, two-factor user authentication (TF-UA) with key agree-
ment (Wu et al., 2010, 2011a,b; Debiao et al., 2012; Wei et al.,
2012) is generally used in which password- and smartcard-
based TF-UA mechanism is popular. Furthermore, anony-
mous TF-UA (Liao and Wang, 2009; Wang et al., 2009,
2011) is the most suitable mechanism that mutually authenti-
cates both user and server without disclosing the real identity
to others (Islam and Biswas, 2011; Khan et al., 2011).
Recently, Wu et al. (2010) proposed a smartcard-based
password authentication scheme for the Telecare Medicine
Information System (TIMS), which is vulnerable to the imper-
sonation and insider attacks (Khan and Alghathbar, 2010) as
proven by (Debiao et al., 2012). In (Debiao et al., 2012), the
authors presented a new TF-UA scheme for TIMS to remove
the loopholes of (Wu et al., 2010). However, Wei et al. (2012)
shows that both the schemes (Wu et al., 2010; Debiao et al.,
2012) fail to protect off-line password guessing attack, i.e.,
an outsider can guess users’ password if he extracts the secret
information stored in the smartcard by monitoring timing
information, power consumption and reverse engineering tech-
niques (Kocher et al., 1999; Messerges et al., 2002). Then Wei
et al. proposed an improved TF-UA scheme. Recently, Wu
et al. (2012) proposed a TF-UA scheme for the integrated
EPR information system, however we identiﬁed that the
scheme is vulnerable to lost smartcard/off-line password guess-
ing (Islam and Biswas, 2013a), privileged-insider (Khan and
Alghathbar, 2010) and known session-speciﬁc temporary
information (Islam and Biswas, 2012a) attacks. Also the
scheme does not provide a provision for lost smartcard revoca-
tion (Fan et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2011) and users’ anonymity
(Liao and Wang, 2009; Islam and Biswas, 2011). Furthermore,
the password change phase is inconvenient to use since the user
cannot change his password without server’s assistance. In thispaper, we proposed an enhanced TF-UA scheme for the inte-
grated EPR information system with enhanced security com-
pared to the existing schemes.
The rest of the paper is divided into following sections. We
described Wu et al.’s TF-UA system in Section 2 and its draw-
backs are given in Section 3. In Section 4, we proposed a TF-
UA scheme and analyzed its security and performance in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 draws some concluding remarks.
2. Review of Wu et al.’s user authentication scheme for
integrated EPR information system
In this section, we brieﬂy reviewed Wu et al.’s user authentica-
tion scheme (Wu et al., 2012) and the notations are listed in
Table 1. The scheme is divided into four phases: registration
phase, login phase, veriﬁcation phase and password change
phase.
2.1. Registration phase
In this phase, user A registers to S to obtain a medical smart-
card. For this purpose, A sends a registration request to S and
then S performs the following operations:
(R-1). A chooses an identity ID and a password pw, and
then submits (ID, pw) to S through a secure channel.
(R-2). S ﬁrst veriﬁes ID and computes v= h(K¯ID), where
the secret number K is chosen by S.
(R-3). S chooses a N and computes [H= v Æ pw+ N,
s= h(pw||K)], where the secretH is different for every user.
(R-4). S issues a smartcard with the parameters [h (Æ), N, s]
and returns it to A through a secure channel.
2.2. Login phase
In this phase, A inserts his smartcard into a card reader and
keys his (ID, pw). Then the smartcard performs the following:
(L-1). Smartcard chooses a random number r1 and com-
putes (C1, C2), where C1 = h(s||r1) and C2 = r1Æpw.
(L-2). Smartcard retrieves N and sends {ID, N, C1, C2} to S
through open channel.
2.3. Veriﬁcation phase
(V-1). S veriﬁes ID of {ID, N, C1, C2}. If it is valid, S pro-
ceeds to the next step, otherwise rejects A’s request.
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v= h(K¯ID) and pw= (H  N) Æ v1.
(V-3). S calculates r01 = pw
1ÆC2 and the secret value
s0 = h(pw||K).
(V-4). S checks whether h(s0||r01)= ?C1. If not, S sends an
error message to A, otherwise go to the next step.
(V-5). S chooses a random number r2, computes a= r2¯-
h(s0), b= h(pw||r2||r01) and sends (a, b) to A through an
open channel.
(V-6). Upon receiving (a, b), A computes r02 = a¯h(s) and
veriﬁes whether b is equal to h(pw||r02||r1). If they are equal,
A conﬁrms that S is valid and sends a message
c= h(pw||r1||r
0
2) to S.
(V-7). S compares c with h(pw||r01||r2) to check whether
both of them are same or not. If so, A is authenticated by
S. After the mutual authentication, both A and S accept
sk= h (r01||r2)= h(r1||r
0
2) = h(r1||r2) as a session key.2.4. Password change phase
(P-1). A sends his old (ID, pw) along with a new password
pwnew to S through a secure channel.
(P-2). S chooses another appropriate number N* to calcu-
late H* = vpwnew + N*. Then S computes s* =
h(pwnew||K), and sends [s
*, N*] to A through a secure
channel.3. Weaknesses of Wu et al.’s user authentication scheme
Wu et al.’s scheme is analyzed, and some weaknesses are inves-
tigated and explored in this section.
3.1. Lost smartcard attack/off-line password guessing attack
Wu et al.’s scheme is a password- and smartcard-based TF-UA
scheme in which the smartcard contains secret information [h
(Æ), N, s] about A, which at a later time is used to authenticate
A. The smartcard-based TF-UA scheme faces the threat of
smartcard security attack while some sensitive information is
stored in the card. The authentication system will be compro-
mised if an attacker extracts the secrets from the smartcard,
and thus some additional mechanism should be taken by the
designer to protect this kind of threat. It is pointed out by
Kocher et al. (1999) andMesserges et al. (2002) that all the exis-
tent smartcard-based schemes are susceptible to lost/stolen
smartcard attack through differential power analysis, because
the conﬁdential information stored in the card could be
extracted by physically monitoring its timing information,
power consumption and reverse engineering techniques; since
once a card has been lost, all secrets in it may be compromised.
Accordingly Wu et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to this attack
(Vaidya et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2011) and its description is
given below:
(1) Suppose an adversary E extracts [h (Æ), N, s] from A’s
lost smartcard.
(2) E collects a valid login message {ID, N, C1, C2} from the
previous session, where C1 = h(s||r1) and C2 = r1 Æ pw.
It is to be noted that r1 = C2/pw and thus, we can write
C1 = h(s||C2/pw).(3) Now, E guesses a password pw*, computes C1
* =
h(s||C2/pw
*) and checks whether C1
* = C1 holds. If it
is, then pw* = pw, otherwise the steps 2 and 3 are
repeated until the correct pw is found.
E can easily ﬁnd A’s password pw just by testing all possible
passwords from the search space |D|, where |D| is the set of all
possible passwords and || represents the cardinality of D. This
kind of off-line password guessing attack is possible within
polynomial-time bound, because user generally chooses a weak
password (low-intensity) for easy memorization and |D| is not
large enough.
3.2. Absence of lost smartcard revocation phase
If a smartcard is lost/stolen and its secret values are known to
an adversary with the help of the techniques proposed in
(Kocher et al., 1999; Messerges et al., 2002), then he can guess
users’ password by applying off-line password guessing attack
(Vaidya et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2011) on the extracted infor-
mation. Thus, the revocation of lost/stolen smartcard is neces-
sary in order to offer strong security to the end users (Fan
et al., 2005). Otherwise the adversary may impersonate the
legal user to login to the server using the lost/stolen smartcard
and old password if the server is unable to distinguish the new
smartcard from the lost card (Khan et al., 2011). However, Wu
et al.’s scheme lacks such a lost smartcard revocation phase.
3.3. Privileged-insider attack
Wu et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the privileged-insider
attack. In the registration phase, A sends his (ID, PW) in plain
text form to S to get a valid smartcard. A privileged-insider E
of S can easily steal (ID, pw) and can perform the malicious
activity in the following way. If A is registered by the same
password pw to other remote servers outsides S for their con-
venience of remembering a long password and ease-of-use,
then E can impersonate A by accessing other servers by using
the same pw if all the servers adopt the same authentication
procedure (Khan and Alghathbar, 2010; Debiao et al., 2012).
3.4. Inconvenient password change phase
Wu et al.’s password change phase is not user-friendly. In pass-
word change, A sends his old (ID, pw) along with a new pass-
word pw* to S through a secure channel. Then S chooses a
number N*, calculates H* = v Æ pw* + N* and s* = h(pw*||K)
and sends [s*, N*] to A through a secure channel. Thus, A can-
not change his password frequently since every time he has to
use the secure channel, which is very difﬁcult to achieve in prac-
tice. In addition, the password change phase is different from
the traditional smartcard-based schemes (Vaidya et al., 2010;
Khan and Alghathbar, 2010), in which password can be chan-
ged directly by the user without remote server’s assistance. So
the frequent password change will put additional burden on
the system.
3.5. Known session-speciﬁc temporary information attack
According to (Canetti and Krawczyk, 2001; Cheng et al., 2005;
Swanson, 2008), the known session-speciﬁc temporary
Table 2 Notations used in the proposed scheme.
Notations Meaning
PWa Password of the user A
IDa Identity of A
k Security parameter
p, q Two large primes p and q such that p= 2q+ 1
Zp
* Multiplicative group of prime order p
g Generator of the group Zp
*
x, y Private and public key of S, where y= gx mod p
SN Identity/serial number of the smartcard
H(Æ) One-way and secure cryptographic hash function,
where H: {0, 1}*ﬁ {0, 1}k
Ta/Ts Timestamp chosen by A/S
SK Session key
E Adversary/privileged-insider
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secrets of a session may harm the secrecy of session key. It is
pointed out by (Mandt and Tan, 2008; Hou et al., 2010) that
this attack is quite practical in some situations since (1) user
and server must trust the internal/external source of random
number generator that may be controlled by an adversary,
and (2) the random numbers are generally stored in insecure
memory device whereas long-term secrets are protected care-
fully. If the random numbers are not erased properly after
the protocol execution, an adversary may hijack users’ com-
puter and get the random numbers. Thus, the authentication
scheme must have the additional ability that could resist this
attack. However, Wu et al.’s scheme is insecure against this
attack where A and S generate the session key sk= h(r1||r2)
and it can be compromised if r1 and r2 are known to an
adversary E. Moreover, this disclosure also leads to compro-
mise A’s password pw from the eavesdropped message {ID,
N, C1 = h(s||r1), C2 = r1 Æ pw} as pw= C2/r1. Thus, Wu
et al.’s scheme needs some countermeasures to protect these
problems.
3.6. Lack of users’ anonymity
In practice, one of the fundamental requirements for secure
communication over an insecure network is users’ anonymity
(Wong et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2009), which makes it very dif-
ﬁcult to recognize the original user from the login message by
an outsider. That is, to preserve secrecy, a user instead of his
static identity, sends a dynamic identity which is calculated
by binding some secret information with the static identity,
otherwise a login message with a static identity reveals some
personal information about the user. An outsider may inter-
cept the user’s login message and try to manipulate with other
parameters to forge login identity known as identity-theft
attack (Liao and Wang, 2009). Wu et al. scheme does not
achieve users’ anonymity. During the authentication phase of
Wu et al.’s scheme, A sends {ID, N, C1, C2} to S over a public
network, which contains the static login identity ID from
which E can easily recognize that the transaction is performed
by A (Khan and Alghathbar, 2010). Thus, Wu et al.’s scheme
does not provide users’ anonymity.
3.7. Other drawbacks of Wu et al.’s authentication system
In addition to the above, Wu et al.’s scheme has some other
drawbacks as given below.
(1) For each user two secrets K and H are kept secret by S,
where K is identical for all users whereas H varies from
user to user. Thus, S has to keep (n+ 1) secret keys i.e.,
a single K and n different H for n users. In practice, it is
possible to achieve mutual authentication between the
server and user by using only one secret key (Wang
et al., 2009; Islam and Biswas, 2011). Thus, more than
one secret puts unnecessary burden on S without
increasing security of the system (Khan and
Alghathbar, 2010; Vaidya et al., 2010).
(2) In the login phase, smartcard computes {ID, N, C1, C2}
without checking the validity of (ID, pw) that leads the
system to suffer from clogging attack, a type of denial
of service (DoS) attack in which E attempts to denyservice by overwhelming the resources of S by replaying
a large volume of fake authentication messages. For
instance, assume that E steals A’s smartcard and com-
putes some fake login messages of type {ID, N, C1
*,
C2
*} with a false pw* along with real identity ID. If E sub-
mits a large number of such fake messages, S will be
busy to process these messages and meanwhile other
legitimate users get rejected while they are trying to
authenticate themselves to S.
4. Proposed scheme for the integrated EPR information system
In this section, we proposed a password and smartcard-based
TF-UA scheme for the integrated EPR medical information
system using Chen et al.’s scheme (2008) and Schnorr’s signa-
ture scheme (1990). The notations used in the scheme are listed
in Table 2. Our scheme is composed of the following phases.
4.1. Initialization phase
In this phase, for given a security parameter k 2 Zþ, S initial-
izes the system’s parameter as follows:
(I-1) S chooses two large primes p and q such that
p= 2q+ 1 and a generator g of Zp.
(I-2) S chooses its private key x 2 Zp and then computes the
public key y ¼ g xmodp.
(I-3) S selects a one-way secure cryptographic hash function
H : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gk
(I-4) Finally, S publishes the system’s parameter
X ¼ fp; g;H ; yg, while the private key x is kept secret.
4.2. Registration phase
(R-1). A chooses an identity-password pair ðIDa; PW aÞ and a
da2RZp, computes V a ¼ HðIDajjPW ajjdaÞ, and sends
ðIDa; V aÞ to S over a secure channel.
(R-2). S checks whether IDa already exists in the database.
If so, S asks A for a fresh identity. Then S selects a ds2RZp,
computes Ds ¼ gds modp and rs ¼ ds  xesmodp, where
es ¼ HðIDajjDsjjSNÞ.
(R-3). S computes V s ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ, V as ¼ HðV aÞ  es,
inserts ½IDa; rs; es; V s; V as; y;HðÞ into the smartcard and
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ðIDa; SNÞ in the database.
(R-4). Now A inserts da into the smartcard and replaces V s
by Ha, where Ha ¼ V s  V a. Finally, the smartcard
contains the information ½IDa; rs; es;Ha; V as; y; da;HðÞ.
4.3. Login phase
(L-1). A inserts his smartcard into a card reader and keys
ðIDa; PW aÞ. Smartcard then checks whether the supplied
IDa is matched with the stored identity. If not, the smart-
card asks A for a valid identity-password pair, otherwise
computes V a ¼ HðIDajjPW ajjdaÞ and e0s ¼ V as  HðV aÞ,
and then checks whether e0s ¼ es holds. If so, the smartcard
chooses a ra2RZq, computes Ra ¼ gra modp and
V s ¼ Ha  V a.
(L-2). Smartcard chooses a current timestamp T a, computes
DIa ¼ IDa  HðT ajjyraÞ and Ca ¼ HðIDajjRajjrsjjesjjT ajjV sÞ,
and then sends M1 ¼ fDIa;Ca;Ra; T a; rs; esg to S.
4.4. Mutual authentication with session key agreement phase
(V-1). S checks whether T 0a  T a 6 DT a holds. If not, S
rejects A’s login request, otherwise goes to next step.
(V-2). S computes IDa ¼ DIa  HðT ajjRxa Þ and rejects A’s
login request if the computed identity is invalid.
(V-3). S obtains SN from the database, computes
ds ¼ rs þ xesmodp, V s ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ and C0a ¼ HðIDajj
RajjrsjjesjjT ajjV sÞ, and veriﬁes whether C0a ¼ Ca is valid. If
the result is negative, S rejects the login request, otherwise
authenticates A.
(V-4). S chooses a rs2RZq, a current timestamp T s,
computes Rs ¼ grs modp, K ¼ ðRaÞrs modp ¼ grars and the
session key SK ¼ HðIDajjT ajjT sjjRajjRsjjKjjV sÞ. S then sends
M2 ¼ fCS ;RS ; T sg to A through a public channel, where
Cs ¼ HðIDajjRajjRsjjT sjjV sjjSKÞ.
(V-5). Upon receiving M2 ¼ fCs;Rs; T sg, A checks whether
T 0s  T s 6 DT s holds. If it fails, A rejects M2 ¼ fCs;Rs; T sg,
otherwise proceeds to the next step.
(V-6). A computes K ¼ ðRsÞra modp ¼ grars , SK ¼ HðIDajjT a
jjT sjjRajjRsjjKjjV sÞ and C0s ¼ HðIDajjRajjRsjjT sjjV sjjSKÞ. If
C0s ¼ Cs holds, A authenticates S and accepts the session
key SK.
4.5. Password change phase
(P-1). A inserts the smartcard into the card reader and keys
the old identity-password pair ðIDa; PW aÞ. Smartcard
checks whether the supplied identity IDa is valid or not by
comparing it with the stored identity in the card. If not,
smartcard rejects the request, otherwise computes
V a ¼ HðIDajjPW ajjdaÞ, e0s ¼ V as  HðV aÞ and veriﬁes
e0s ¼ es. If it is, smartcard asks A for a new password.
(P-2). A keys a new password PW anew and then the smart-
card computes V anew ¼ HðIDajjPW anewjjdaÞ, V asnew ¼
HðV anewÞ  es and Hanew ¼ Ha  V a  V anew. Finally,smartcard’s memory is updated by replacing ½IDa; rs; es;
Ha; V as; y; da;HðÞ with ½IDa; rs; es;Hanew; V asnew; y; da;HðÞ.
4.6. Lost smartcard revocation phase
To revoke a lost/stolen smartcard, our scheme performs the
following operations:
(S-1). A picks a d 0a2RZp, computes V 0a ¼ HðIDajjPW ajjd 0aÞ
and sends ðIDa; V 0aÞ to S over a secure channel.
(S-2). S checks A’s credentials, e.g., date of birth, national
ID card number, or some other values from which A can be
uniquely identiﬁed. Afterward, S reads the serial number
SN 0 from the new card, selects a d 0s2RZp, computes D0s ¼
gd
0
s modp and r0s ¼ d 0s  xe0smodp, where e0s ¼ HðIDajj
D0sjjSN 0Þ.
(S-3). S also computes V 0s ¼ HðIDajjd 0sjjSN 0Þ and
V 0as ¼ HðV 0aÞ  e0s. S inserts ½IDa; r0s; e0s; V 0s; V 0as; y;HðÞ into
the new card, returns it to A over a secure channel and
updates ðIDa; SNÞ with ðIDa; SN 0Þ to the database.
(S-4). Now, A inserts d 0a into the new card and replaces V
0
s
by H 0a, where H
0
a ¼ V 0s  V 0a. Finally, the new smartcard
contains the information ½IDa; r0s; e0s;H 0a; V 0as; y; d 0a;HðÞ.
In case of revocation of lost/stolen smartcard, there exists
another serious problem. If the smartcard and password both
are lost, then the user is strongly recommended to re-register
with a new password to the server to get a new smartcard even
if the system is able to resist the off-line password guessing
attack. Otherwise, an adversary can masquerade the legitimate
user using the lost smartcard and password.
5. Security and efﬁciency analysis of the proposed scheme
This section analyzes the security aspects of our scheme and
also compares with the previous schemes.
5.1. Informal security analysis
In this section, we will provide an informal security analysis of
our scheme that satisﬁes most of the security requirements as
discussed below:
5.1.1. Replay and parallel session attack
This attack may occur frequently from an active adversary
who tries to impersonate a legitimate user/server by replaying
some eavesdropped messages. Suppose E collects A’s login
message M1 ¼ fDIa;Ca;Ra;Ta; rs; esg from the previous ses-
sion and replays it to S in the current session. However, S
rejects E as T0a  Ta 6 DTa is invalid. Furthermore, E may
send a modiﬁed message M001 ¼ fDIa;Ca;Ra;T00a ; rs; esg to S,
where T00a is the current timestamp. In this case, E also gets
rejected since C00a–Ca. Also, E cannot impersonate S by replay-
ing an old message M2 ¼ fCs;Rs;Tsg and thus, our scheme is
secured from this attack. Besides, our scheme also resists par-
allel session attack in which an adversary tries to impersonate
a legal user without knowing the correct password. In this
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from the previous messages. Suppose E collects M1 ¼ fDIa;
Ca;Ra;Ta; rs; esg and M2 ¼ fCs;Rs;Tsg, however, he cannot
generate any fabricated valid login and authentication
messages from fM1;M2g without the secret key and the secret
values stored on the smartcard. Furthermore, E cannot imper-
sonate A just by replaying the eavesdropped messages
fM1;M2g due to the inclusion of time stamps Ta and Ts in
fM1;M2g.
5.1.2. Off-line/On-line password guessing attack
In general, a user chooses a weak password for easy memoriza-
tion and therefore, the password guessing attack (Liao and
Wang, 2009; Vaidya et al., 2010) may occur from an active
adversary if an efﬁcient scheme is not followed. Suppose E col-
lects ½IDa; rs; es;Ha;Vas; y; da;HðÞ from the lost/stolen smart-
card using differential power analysis (Kocher et al., 1999;
Messerges et al., 2002) and tries to guess the correct password
by applying some off-line mechanism on Ha ¼ Vs  Va,
Vs ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ and Va ¼ HðIDajjPWajjdaÞ. To obtain
Va from Ha, and PWa from Va, E must learn the random num-
ber ds chosen by S. However, the probability of guessing it and
thus the password is 2k , where k is the security parameter. So
the off-line password guessing attack is hard. On the other
hand, our scheme also protects on-line password guessing
attack in which E guesses a password of A and generates a fab-
ricated login message and sends it to S. E repeats this process
until to get login to S. If this happens, it indicates that E suc-
cessfully masquerade A. Now E guesses a password PWa,
chooses Ha; r

s ; e

s ; d

a; r

a2RZq, a timestamp Ta, computes
Ra ¼ gr

a modp, DIa ¼ IDa HðTajjyr

aÞ, Vs ¼ Ha HðIDajj
PWajjdaÞ, Ca ¼ HðIDajjRajjrs jjes jjTajjVs Þ and sends
M1 ¼ fDIa;Ca;Ra;Ta; rs ; esg to S. Then S computes
IDa ¼ DIa HðTajjðRaÞ xÞ, d00s ¼ rs þ xes , V00s ¼ HðIDajjd00s jj
SNÞ and C00a ¼ HðIDajjRajjrs jjes jjTajjV00s Þ, and observes that
C00a–C

a since V
00
s–V

s . Therefore, S rejects authentication
request made by E.5.1.3. Privileged-insider attack
In real-life application, a user may access different servers by
using the same identity and password for his convenience.
However, if a privileged-insider of S learns the password
PWa of A, he may of course impersonate A by using the stolen
password to get access to all the servers, where A is registered
as a legitimate user. However, our scheme can make this kind
of attack ineffectual, since A is registered to S by sending
ðIDa;VaÞ instead of ðIDa;PWaÞ, where da in Va ¼ HðIDajj
PWajjdaÞ is unknown to the insider of S, so he cannot
obtainPWa just by performing off-line guessing attack on Va.
5.1.4. Impersonation attack
To make this attack successful, E tries to authenticate himself
maliciously as A to S (or as S to A). However, this attack is
infeasible in our scheme since E cannot generate A’s login mes-
sageM1 ¼ fDIa;Ca;Ra;Ta; rs; esg without smartcard and pass-
word PWa. Because E cannot compute Vs ¼ Ha  HðIDajj
PWajjdaÞ and Ca ¼ HðIDajjRajjrsjjesjjTajjVsÞ as well. In other
way, server’s impersonation attack is also infeasible here since
E cannot generate M2 ¼ fCs;Rs;Tsg without x, where
ds ¼ rs þ xes and Vs ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ. Also, E cannotcompute x from the public key y ¼ gxmodp due to DLP
and thus, this attack is hard in our scheme.
5.1.5. User’s anonymity problem
In login phase, user A transmits a dynamic identity
DIa ¼ IDa HðTajjyraÞ, which differs session to session due
to Ta and ra. The random number ra is unknown to E so he
cannot extract IDa from DIa and also it cannot be guessed
within polynomial-time. Thus, users’ anonymity is achieved
in our scheme.
5.1.6. Mutual authentication and session key agreement
The login and mutual authentication with session key agree-
ment phases are necessary in an authentication system to pro-
vide the data security and privacy of the user who wish to
communicate with a remote server over insecure channel.
Our scheme supports secure mutual authentication and session
key generation.5.1.7. Protection of data integrity
The protection and integrity of data during transmission over
insecure network is achieved in our scheme in two ways.
Firstly, the integrity of login and authentication of messages
is done safely at the server- and user-side using C0a ¼ Ca and
C0s ¼ Cs. Secondly, during transmission the integrity, conﬁden-
tiality and security of data are achieved using the session key
SK. After mutual authentication and session key agreement,
the sensitive messages are encrypted with the session key and
then transmitted over an open channel so the eavesdropper
cannot infringe the privacy of the message.
5.1.8. Session key perfect forward secrecy
Our scheme satisﬁes the session key perfect forward secrecy
(Blake-Wilson et al., 1997), i.e., even if the secret key x is dis-
closed, E cannot impersonate A. Because E cannot generate a
valid session key SK ¼ HðIDajjTajjTsjjRajjRsjjKjjVsÞ without
K ¼ grars and Vs ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ. Thus, our scheme provides
session key perfect forward secrecy.
5.1.9. Known session-speciﬁc temporary information attack
The proposed scheme protects the known session-speciﬁc tem-
porary information attack (Islam and Biswas, 2011, 2013a). In
our scheme, S and A compute the session key
SK ¼ HðIDajjTajjTsjjRajjRsjjKjjVsÞ, where K ¼ grars and
Vs ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ. If the session ephemeral secrets ra and
rs are compromised, however SK is still secured, because
Vs ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ is unknown to E.
5.1.10. Known-key attack
The known-key attack means that E cannot compute any of
the future/previous session keys even if the current session
key is compromised (Blake-Wilson et al., 1997). In our scheme,
a fresh session key SK is generated in each session by using
random numbers ra and rs. The freshness of SK depends on
ra and rs. Suppose a session key SK of the current session is
compromised to E, however due to the one-way property of
the hash function, E will not be able to derive any secrets.
Thus, other session keys cannot be generated from the knowl-
edge of the leaked session key.
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According to (Chatterjee et al., 2014; Das and Bruhadeshwar,
2013), in this section, we discussed the formal analysis about
the security of the proposed scheme.
Deﬁnition 1 (Negligible function). A function eðkÞ is said to be
negligible, if for every c > 0, there exists k0 such that
eðkÞ 6 kc for every kP k0.
Deﬁnition 2 (Formal deﬁnition of one-way cryptographic hash
function). A collision resistant one-way cryptographic hash
function HðÞ : X! Y, where X ¼ f0; 1g and Y ¼ f0; 1gk, is
a deterministic algorithm that takes x 2 f0; 1g as input and
outputs y ¼ HðxÞ 2 f0; 1gk. If AdvHashE ðt1Þ denotes the advan-
tage in ﬁnding a collision by a probabilistic polynomial-time
bound adversary E, we deﬁned
AdvHashE ðt1Þ ¼ Pr½ERðx1; x2Þ : x1–x2 andHðx1Þ ¼ Hðx2Þ;
where Pr[X] denotes the probability of a random event X, and
ERðx1; x2Þ denotes the pair ðx1; x2Þ is selected randomly by E.
The probability of success in ﬁnding a collision in H(Æ) is com-
puted over the random choices made by E with the execution
time t1. The hash function H(Æ) is then called collision resis-
tant, if AdvHashE ðt1Þ 6 e1, for any sufﬁciently small e1 > 0.
Deﬁnition 3 (Formal deﬁnition of discrete logarithm
problem). Let p and q are two large prime numbers such that
p= 2q+ 1 and g be a generator of a multiplicative cyclic
group Zp
* of order p. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
states that for given ðg; gaÞ, it is computationally hard by
any polynomial-time bounded algorithm E for ﬁnding a, where
a 2 Zp is unknown to him. Formally, if AdvDLPE ðt2Þ denotes an
adversary A’s advantage in ﬁnding a, we have AdvDLPE ðt2Þ ¼
Pr½Eðg; gaÞ ¼ a : a 2 Zp. The probability of success of ﬁnding
a from ðg; gaÞ in AdvDLPE ðt2Þ is computed over the random
choices made by E with the execution time t2. The DLP is com-
putationally infeasible, if AdvDLPE ðt2Þ 6 e2, for any sufﬁciently
small e2 > 0.
We then deﬁne the following random oracles for the formal
security analysis:
 Reveal1: This random oracle will unconditionally output
the input x from the corresponding hash value y= h(x).
 Reveal2: This random oracle will unconditionally output a
from the pair ðg; gaÞ.Theorem 1. Suppose that the hash function closely behaves
like a random oracle, then the proposed scheme is provably
secure against a probabilistic polynomial-time bounded adver-
sary for deriving the session key established between the user
and the server.
Proof. Assume that E is a probabilistic polynomial-time
bounded adversary, who runs the experiment Exp1HashE in order
to break the security of the session key SK of the proposed
scheme. We deﬁned the success probability for the experimentExp1HashE as Succ1 ¼ 2Pr½Exp1HashE ¼ 1  1. The advantage of
Exp1HashE is deﬁned as Adv1ðet1; qR1Þ ¼MaxEfSucc1g, where
the maximum is taken over all E with the execution time et1
and the number of queries qR1 made to the oracle Reveal1.
We can say that the proposed scheme is provably secure
against E for deriving the session key SK between the user A
and the server S, if Adv1ðet1; qR1Þ 6 e3, for any sufﬁciently
small e3 > 0. Based on the experiment given below (algorithm
1), E can derive the session key SK from the transmitted mes-
sages between A and S, if he/she has the ability to invert the
one-way hash function H(). From the Deﬁnition 2, we have
Adv1HashE ðt1Þ 6 e1 for any sufﬁciently small e1 > 0 and thus the
advantage Adv1ðet1; qR1Þ is negligible, since it depends on
Adv1HashE ðt1Þ. Therefore, E will get success for deriving the ses-
sion key SK with negligible probability and as a result, the pro-
posed scheme is provably secure against E. h
Algorithm 1: Exp1HashE
1: Intercept the message M2 ¼ fCS;RS;Tsg during
authentication phase sent to the user A by the server S, where
Cs ¼ HðIDajjRajjRsjjTsjjVsjjSKÞ
2: Call Reveal1 oracle on input Cs to retrieve IDa, Ra, Rs, Ts, Vs
and SK as ðIDajjRajjRs jjTs jjVs jjSKÞ  Reveal1ðCsÞ
3: Intercept the message M1 ¼ fDIa;Ca;Ra;Ta;rs; esg during the
login phase sent from A to S, where
Ca ¼ HðIDajjRajjrsjjesjjTajjVsÞ
4: Call the oracle Reveal1 on input Ca to retrieve IDa, Ra, rs, es,
Ta and Vs as ðIDa jjRa jjrs jjes jjTa jjVs Þ  Reveal1ðCaÞ
5: If ðIDa ¼ IDaÞ andðRa ¼ RaÞ and ðRs ¼ Rs Þ and ðVs ¼ Vs Þ
then
6: Accept SK as the correct session key SK shared between A
and S
7: Return 1 (Success)
8: Else
9: Return 0 (Failure)
10: End IfTheorem 2. Assume that hash function closely behaves like a
random oracle and the hardness of DLP, the proposed scheme
is provably secure against a probabilistic polynomial-time
bounded adversary for deriving the password of the user and
the secret key of the server, even if the adversary extracts all
the secret information from the lost/stolen smartcard.
Proof. Assume that E runs the experiment Exp2HashDLP;E, which is
described below (algorithm 2), in order to obtain the password
PWa of A and the secret key x of S from the information
stored in A’s smartcard. We deﬁned the success probability
for the experiment Exp2HashDLP;E as Succ2 ¼ 2Pr½Exp2HashDLP;E ¼ 1
1. The advantage of Exp2HashDLP;E is deﬁned as Adv2ðet2;
qR1; eR2Þ ¼MaxEfSucc2g, where the maximum is taken over
all E with the execution time et2 and the number of queries
qR1 and qR2 made to the oracles Reveal1 and Reveal2. We
can say that the proposed scheme is provably secure against
E for deriving the password PWa of A and the secret key x
of S, if Adv2ðet2; qR1; eR2Þ 6 e4, for any sufﬁciently small
e4 > 0. Based on the experiment Exp2
Hash
DLP;E, E can extract the
Table 4 Computational notations and their descriptions.
Notations Descriptions
TML Time complexity for executing the modular
multiplication
TEXP Time complexity of executing the modular
exponentiation operation, TEXP  240TML
TINV Time complexity for executing the modular inversion
operation, TINV  11.6TML
TH Time complexity for executing the hash function,
which is negligible
TX Time complexity for executing the XOR operation,
which is negligible
Table 3 Security comparison of the proposed scheme with others.
Schemes/attributes UIA PIA RA OFGA SSA LSA KSSTIA LSR SPC KKA PFS MA SSKA UA
Lu et al. (2008) Yes No Yes No Yes NA No NA Yes Yes Yes No No No
Xu et al. (2009) No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Wu et al. (2010) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Debiao et al. (2012) Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Wei et al. (2012) Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Wu et al. (2012) Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Proposed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
UIA: Resilience against user impersonation attack; PIA: Resilience against privileged-insider attack; RA: Resilience against replay attack;
OFPGA/ONPGA: Resilience against off-line/on-line password guessing attack; SSA: Resilience against server’s spooﬁng attack; LSA: Resi-
lience against lost smartcard attack; KSSTIA: Resilience against known session-speciﬁc temporary information attack; LSR: Provides lost
smartcard revocation; SPC: Provides secure password change phase; KKA: Resilience against known-key attack; PFS: Provides perfect forward
secrecy; MA: Provides mutual authentication; SSKA: Provides secure session key agreement; UA: Provides user’s anonymity/secrecy. NA: Not
applicable.
218 S.H. Islam, G.P. Biswasinformation IDa; rs; es;Ha;Vas; y; da;HðÞ stored in A’s smart-
card and derive the password PWa of A and the secret key x
of S, if he/she has the ability to invert the one-way hash func-
tion H() and solve the DLP. From the Deﬁnition 2 and
Deﬁnition 3, we have AdvHashE ðt1Þ 6 e1 and AdvDLPE ðt2Þ 6 e2,
for any sufﬁciently small e1; varepsilon2 > 0. Thus it can be
concluded that the advantage Adv2ðet2; qR1; eR2Þ is negligible,
since it depends on both AdvHashE ðt1Þ and AdvDLPE ðt2Þ. We can
say that the probability of success of E for deriving the pass-
word PWa of A and the secret key x of S is negligible.
Therefore, our scheme is provably secure against E for deriv-
ing the password PWa of A and the secret key x of S. h5.3. Efﬁciency analysis
In this section, we analyze the functional requirements and
computation costs to evaluate the efﬁciency of our scheme
and compared it with others.
5.3.1. Consistency and ﬂexibility
A simple password-based user authentication scheme helps to
achieve some basic security requirements and only the server
authenticates a remote user. However, this is not the case in
many real-life applications (e.g., secret online order placement,
online banking tractions) where some sensitive messages areexchanged between user and server, and also authentication
of the server is required, otherwise an adversary may imper-
sonate the server to steal user secret information. Our scheme
provides mutual authentication, which provides consistency
between user and server. Furthermore, mutual authentication
is not sufﬁcient to provide the data integrity and conﬁdential-
ity, a session key negotiation is also important for establishing
a secure channel between them. The proposed scheme not only
achieves mutual authentication, but also provides a session key
agreement, which makes our scheme more ﬂexible for various
applications.
Algorithm 2: Exp2HashDLP;E
1: Capture the lost/stolen smartcard and extract the information
IDa; rs; es;Ha;Vas; y; da;HðÞ using the methods proposed in
(Kocher et al., 1999; Messerges et al., 2002), where
Va ¼ HðIDajjPWajjdaÞ, Ds ¼ gds modp, rs ¼ ds  xesmodp,
es ¼ HðIDajjDsjjSNÞ and Vs ¼ HðIDajjdsjjSNÞ
2: Call the Reveal1 oracle on input Va to retrieve IDa, PWa and da
as ðIDajjPWajjdaÞ  Reveal1ðVaÞ
3: Call the Reveal1 oracle on input es to retrieve IDa, Ds and SN
as ðIDa jjDs jjSNÞ  Reveal1ðesÞ
4: Call the Reveal2 oracle on input Ds to retrieve ds as
ðds Þ  Reveal2ðDs Þ
5: Compute x ¼ e1s ðds  rsÞmodp
6: If ðIDa ¼ IDaÞ and ðda ¼ daÞ then
7: Accept PWa as the correct passwordPWa of A and x
 as the
secret key x of S
8: Return 1 (Success)
9: Else
10: Return 0 (Failure)
11: End If5.3.2. Scalability and fairness
In our scheme, a user is free to choose and change his pass-
word without remote server’s assistance. In addition, our
scheme stores user’s secret information on the smartcard and
the user memorizes his password. These are used to accomplish
mutual authentication and session key agreement so that the
server does not need to maintain a large password-veriﬁcation
table. Note that each card identiﬁer recorded by the system is
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Cryptanalysis and improvement of a password-based user authentication scheme 219quite short and the system does not require keeping these card
identiﬁers secret. This approach is cost efﬁcient and secure as
compared with maintaining the password table in a traditional
remote authentication scheme. Therefore, the server can
accommodate a large number of users without compromising
user secrecy. Besides, our scheme provides most of the security
features and it provides scalability and fairness in secure data
transmission over hostile networks.
5.3.3. Comparison of the proposed scheme with others
A security comparison of our scheme with (Lu et al., 2008; Xu
et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2010, 2012; Wei et al., 2012; Debiao
et al., 2012) is given in Table 3 that shows our scheme protects
most of the attacks.
A comparison of our scheme with others is given from the
perspective of computational cost efﬁciency. According to
(Islam and Biswas, 2012a,b,c, 2013b,c,d, 2014a,b), the differ-
ent time complexities and their conversion to the time com-
plexity for executing modular multiplication (TML) are given
in Table 4. The computation cost comparison is given in
Table 5 that shows our scheme reduced the computation cost
compared to (Xu et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2010; Debiao et al.,
2012), but increases the same with respect to (Lu et al., 2008;
Wei et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2012). However, our scheme has
some limitations such as (1) high computation cost, (2) both
the server and the user must be synchronized for timestamp
realization; (3) user must have extra ability to store a random
number into the smartcard and (4) the memory requirement
our scheme is high. To store the information ½rs; es;Ha;
Vas; y; da into the smartcard our scheme needs 3(|p| + |h|) bits
whereas Wu et al.’s scheme (2012) requires (|p| + |h|) bits for
[N, s], where the length of the identity is ignored. Here |p|
and |h| represent the bit length of the modulus p and the
output length of the hash function h(Æ). It may be noted that
the increased computation cost and limitations of our scheme
can be considered quite reasonable with the assurance of better
security features.
6. Conclusions
This paper studied Wu et al.’s password-based user authentica-
tion scheme for the integrated EPR information system and
identiﬁed some security weaknesses such as privileged-insider
attack, lost smartcard/off-line password guessing attack and
known session-speciﬁc temporary information attack.
Furthermore, it does not support revocation of lost/stolen
smartcard and user’s anonymity. Also its password change
phase is inefﬁcient and inconvenient. Thus, a new two-factor
user authentication scheme for the integrated EPR informa-
tion system is proposed using Chen et al.’s protocol and
Schnorr’s signature scheme. The security and efﬁciency analy-
sis of our scheme are made and compared with others, which
ensure that our scheme is more secure, consistent, ﬂexible
and scalable.
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